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NOTE
WE ARE WHAT WE EAT: SECURING OUR
FOOD SUPPLY BY AMENDING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
FOR PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES
MEGHAN MARRINAN FELICIANO
INTRODUCTION
While many may ponder the consequences of global warming,
perhaps the biggest single environmental catastrophe in human
history is unfolding in the garden. While all are rightly concerned
about the possibility of nuclear war, an equally devastating time
bomb is ticking away in the fields of farmers all over the world.
Loss of genetic diversity in agriculture – silent, rapid, inexorable
– is leading us to a rendezvous with extinction – to the doorstep
of hunger on a scale we refuse to imagine. . . . Reducing the
diversity of life, we narrow our options for the future and render
our own survival more precarious.1
Around the world, an amazing array of plants have been cultivated and
developed over many thousands of years, adapting to diverse climates and
evolving to withstand various diseases and pests. The genetic resources
found in the germplasm2 of these plants are invaluable, as these diverse
traits offer the means for plants to survive and thrive under a multitude of
conditions. Today, crop genetic diversity is at great risk, and its diminishing
existence threatens the sustainability of the world’s food supply. The danger
is real: between 1903 and 1983, more than 95% of U.S. tomato varieties
were lost.3 If we want tomatoes, as well as other crops, to remain on the
table, we must act to preserve the diverse genetic resources found in agri-
culture around the globe.
1. CARY FOWLER & PAT MOONEY, SHATTERING: FOOD, POLITICS, AND THE LOSS OF GE-
NETIC DIVERSITY ix (1990).
2. Plant germplasm is described as “the genetic information encoded in the seed.” Jack
Kloppenburg, Jr. & Daniel Lee Kleinman, The Plant Germplasm Controversy, 37 BIOSCIENCE
190, 190 (1987).
3. FATAL HARVEST: THE TRAGEDY OF INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE 59 (Andrew Kimbrell ed.,
2002) [hereinafter FATAL HARVEST].
546
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The legal approach to plant genetic resources (PGRs) has undergone a
seismic shift in the past eighty years. Historically, germplasm was regarded
as the “common heritage of [hu]mankind,”4 meaning anyone could acquire
seed and cultivate it as they wished.5 Despite the fact that germplasm could
not be commodified, it was consistently regarded as a prized resource,6 rec-
ognized as a cornerstone of life. Until the early 1900s, the U.S.’s invest-
ment in PGRs was primarily the role of the government, in collaboration
with farmers around the country. However, in 1930, the United States cre-
ated, and has since increasingly strengthened, intellectual property (IP)
rights in plants.7 This shift has transferred PGR investment and innovation
from the public sector to the private sector.
The goals of IP law are noble. The Constitution gives Congress the
power to grant authors and inventors exclusive rights to their writings and
discoveries, for a limited time, in order to “promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts.”8 By creating incentives for people to invent and discover,
IP law is intended to promote innovation and further the common good.
However, in the context of PGRs, the current constellation of IP protections
fails to meet these underlying goals. This failure is burdening farmers, ben-
efiting large corporations, and endangering the sustainability of our food
supply. To address these concerns, this Note urges Congress to restructure
the legal treatment of PGRs in the United States; Congress is advised to
evaluate proposals based on how well they (1) preserve crop genetic diver-
sity and (2) equitably reward agricultural innovation and labor. This Note
provides four suggestions to further these goals.
Part I of this Note demonstrates the vital role of PGRs and exposes the
current crisis related to these resources. Part II traces the legal treatment of
PGRs in the United States, beginning with the “common heritage” attitude
of our nation’s founders through the creation of, and steady increase in,
plant breeders’ rights. Part III analyzes the connection between the precari-
ous state of our food supply and the current legal treatment of PGRs. Part
IV addresses the asymmetrical rights currently vested in PGRs, and exam-
ines some of the costs of this inequity. Part V concludes with a plea to
Congress and offers suggestions for the restructuring of plant-related IP
rights, focusing on justice and long-term food security.
4. Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, 11 CARDOZO J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 247, 305 (2003) [hereinafter Weeds, Seeds & Deeds].
5. See id. at 257.
6. See id.
7. In 1930, with its passage of the Plant Patent Act, Congress first recognized certain plants
as patentable subject matter. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2006). Since then, Congress and the Courts have
expanded IP protection for plants.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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I. PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES ARE AT THE CORE OF FOOD SECURITY
As the opening quote of this Note states, a “devastating time bomb is
ticking away in the fields of farmers all over the world.”9 This time bomb is
the rapid loss of agricultural genetic diversity.10 This section initially ex-
plains the importance of cultivating diverse PGRs. It then exposes the cur-
rent, undesirable state of agriculture in terms of crop genetic diversity. This
provides the backdrop for the legal analysis to follow.
A. Diverse Plant Genetic Resources are Essential for Healthy,
Sustainable Crops
Genetic diversity is crucial to agriculture, contributing to healthy crops
and sustainable farming practices.11 When large amounts of crops are ge-
netically uniform, they are collectively vulnerable to the same diseases and
pests and “a single instance of disease or infestation of a pest can spread
rapidly, practically unchecked, amongst the entire crop.”12 For example, the
Irish potato famine of the 1840s (which lasted for five years and killed one
to two million people, as well as induced another one to two million to
migrate to North America) was caused by a potato fungus called
Phytophthora infestans.13 At the time, all of the potatoes grown in Europe
were descended from two lines of potatoes, brought over from the Andes.14
These genetically-similar potatoes were not resistant to the fungus, and the
disease spread rapidly, reaching epidemic proportions.15 Thankfully, di-
verse local varieties (often referred to as landraces) around the world have
co-evolved with pests and diseases, and thus offer a wealth of potential
genetic resistance to various agricultural challenges.16 During the potato
famine, resistance to Phytophtora infestans was eventually located amongst
the thousands of distinct types of potatoes in the Andes and Mexico.17
“Without it, potatoes probably would not be a major crop in the developed
world today.”18
In agriculture, plant breeders continue to lean on the diverse genetic
resources developed in plants around the world. For example, a wide array
of PGRs will likely be necessary to combat the “superweeds” — “weeds
that can tolerate herbicides because of crossbreeding via airborne pollen
9. FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 1, at ix.
10. See id.
11. See Susan E. Gustad, Legal Ownership of Plant Genetic Resources: Fewer Options for
Farmers, 18 HAMLINE L. REV. 459, 459 (1995).
12. Keith Aoki, Seeds of Dispute: Intellectual-Property Rights and Agricultural Biodiversity,
3 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 79, 124 (2009) [hereinafter Seeds of Dispute].
13. See FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 1, at 45.
14. Id. at 43.
15. See id. at 45.
16. See Seeds of Dispute, supra note 12, at 125.
17. See FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 1, at 45.
18. Id.
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with herbicide-tolerant crops”19 — which have begun to evolve in the wake
of industrial agriculture. However, modern industrial agriculture is increas-
ing crop monocultures throughout the globe, which “not only limits what
we can eat today, but also reduces the choices of future generations.”20 As
crops continue to face threats from disease, pests, and weeds, the preserva-
tion of PGRs is crucial, because “[d]esirable genetic traits cannot be created
from whole cloth; they can only be copied from other plants.”21
For some crops, genetic variation is important for effective evolution;
without variation, these crops may eventually become extinct.22 As two
prominent authors state, “The genetic diversity being lost today is the foun-
dation of future plant breeding, of future plant evolution. If enough diver-
sity is lost, the ability of crops to adapt and evolve will have been
destroyed.”23
Uniform, genetically engineered crops, commonplace in modern in-
dustrial agriculture, do offer some agricultural benefits. For example, crops
can be engineered for resistance to environmental stresses and a decreased
need for chemical pesticides.24 However, as the evolution of superweeds
foreshadows, it is crucial to preserve the world’s treasure-trove of diverse
PGRs which have evolved over thousands of years, keeping in mind that a
loss in genetic diversity “eliminates the only defense against disease that
farmers and plant breeders may have.”25
B. The Crisis: Crop Genetic Diversity Has Been Slashed Dangerously
Low
Industrial agriculture is a term which describes a method of food pro-
duction which “depends on massive chemical and biological inputs, huge
monocultures, and factory-like farms and that results in huge corporate
profits.”26 This industrial culture is quite different from the world’s tradi-
tional agrarian way of local, fully integrated food systems.27 The practices
of industrial agriculture have “brought a staggering number of negative side
effects, many of them unanticipated,”28 including an alarming loss of crop
19. Seeds of Dispute, supra note 12, at 142.
20. FATAL HARVEST, supra note 3, at 58–59.
21. Peter J. Goss, Guiding the Hand That Feeds: Toward Socially Optimal Appropriability in
Agricultural Biotechnology Innovation, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1395, 1402 (1996).
22. See Seeds of Dispute, supra note 12, at 126.
23. FOWLER & MOONEY, supra note 1, at 89.
24. See Goss, supra note 21, at 1400–01; Anne E. Crocker, Will Plants Finally Grow into
Full Patent Protection on an International Level? A Look at the History of U.S. and International
Patent Law Regarding Patent Protection for Plants and the Likely Changes After the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s Decision, in J.E.M. Ag. Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 251, 289
(2003).
25. Seeds of Dispute, supra note 12, at 125.
26. FATAL HARVEST, supra note 3, at 1.
27. See Douglas Tompkins, Prologue in FATAL HARVEST, supra note 3, at xi.
28. Id.
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biodiversity. “The U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) esti-
mates more than three-quarters of agricultural genetic diversity was lost in
this past century.”29 Prior to the “Green Revolution” of industrial agricul-
ture, seeds were selected for and adapted to diverse local conditions, “a
process that drew upon and contributed to broad genetic diversity.”30 How-
ever, industrial agriculture takes a different approach, seeking to adapt a
uniform, monocultured seed to the stresses of various environments.31
When commercial plant breeders began selecting plants for cer-
tain characteristics (such as yield or a particular type of taste)
until they arrived at a uniform “pure line” that reproduced uni-
formly, they inadvertently and unintentionally opened a Pan-
dora’s box leading to widespread crop monoculture and increased
vulnerability to pests and diseases.32
In a study conducted by the Rural Advancement Foundation Interna-
tional (RAFI), it was found that between the years 1903 and 1983, the
United States lost nearly 93% of its lettuce varieties, over 96% of sweet
corn, about 91% of field corn, more than 95% of tomato, and almost 98% of
asparagus.33 During the last century, over 7,000 named varieties of apples
were grown in the United States.34 Today, less than fifteen percent of these
varieties survive,35 and “two varieties alone account for more than 50 per-
cent of the current apple market.”36 Likewise, at the close of the twentieth
century, “73 percent of all the lettuce grown in the United States was ice-
berg. This relatively bland variety is often the only choice consumers have.
Meanwhile, we have lost hundreds of varieties of lettuce with flavors rang-
ing from bitter to sweet and colors from dark purple to light green.”37 As
this diminishing diversity suggests, monocultures are spreading through
farm fields around America: “Six types of corn now occupy 71 percent of
the acreage in the United States, while two types of peas occupy 96 percent
of the national acreage.”38 Of the over 5,000 varieties of potatoes found
worldwide, only four are major commercial varieties.39 With this growing
crop monoculture, “[g]enetic erosion threatens to cause the degradation of
the ability of agriculture to meet global food demand.”40
29. Id. at 59.
30. Seeds of Dispute, supra note 12, at 128.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 124.
33. FATAL HARVEST, supra note 3, at 59.
34. Id. at 71.
35. See id. at 79.
36. Id. at 58.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 71.
39. See id. at 81.
40. Seeds of Dispute, supra note 12, at 127.
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II. UNITED STATES LEADS THE DRIFT OF PLANT GENETICS INTO
THE REALM OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Coinciding with the steep decline in crop genetic diversity is a histori-
cal shift in the legal treatment of PGRs. This shift is contributing to the
crisis. The creation and growth of U.S. intellectual property rights in PGRs
is chronicled below. The issue of IP protection for plants is also an impor-
tant and controversial discussion topic among nations.41 While this Note
focuses on the United States’ domestic policy towards PGRs, it is worth
noting that on the international scene the United States is one of the strong-
est advocates of patent protection for plants.42 In general, “developed coun-
tries are greatly in favor of uniformity of intellectual property standards that
offer strong protections for inventor rights.”43 Though this Note addresses
the nation’s domestic IP rights in plants, the policy considerations presented
in this Note apply to international debates as well, and the United States
would be wise to reconsider its international positions on PGRs in addition
to restructuring its domestic approach.
A. Before Commodification of the Seed: Communal Innovation
Until 1930, “germplasm was not legally viewed as something suscepti-
ble to characterization as property.”44 Rather, the germplasm of staple crops
was viewed as the “common heritage of [hu]mankind,” freely accessible for
all to use.45 Despite the fact that germplasm could not be commodified,
people did regard it as a valuable resource. For thousands of years, cultiva-
tors around the world labored intensely to develop and improve crops.46
Nations treated germplasm “as a strategic and valuable natural resource
akin to land or water.”47 For example, in the late eighteenth century, Brazil
controlled 95% of the world’s rubber market, and in an attempt to protect
this national resource, Brazil prohibited the export of rubber tree
germplasm.48
41. See generally Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992,
Hein’s No. KAV 3747 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993) (the Convention on Biological Diversity
is an international, legally binding treaty dedicated to conservation and sustaining biodiversity);
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources, opened for signature Nov. 3, 2001, Hein’s No.
KAV 8291 (entered into force June 29, 2004) (the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources
is an international agreement aimed at guaranteeing food security through sustainable agriculture);
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, effective Jan. 1, 1995,
Hein’s No. KAV 4054 (TRIPS is an agreement administered by the World Trade Organization
that sets international intellectual property standards).
42. See Crocker, supra note 24, at 254.
43. Id. at 285.
44. Weeds, Seeds & Deeds, supra note 4, at 257.
45. Id. at 305.
46. See Seeds of Dispute, supra note 12, at 110.
47. Weeds, Seeds & Deeds, supra note 4, at 257.
48. See id. at 263.
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Historically, like many regions in the Northern Hemisphere, the United
States as a whole was a relatively gene-poor nation. It lacked the drastically
diverse collection of PGRs common in many areas of the Southern Hemi-
sphere. For example, “[o]f crops of economic importance, only sunflowers,
blueberries, cranberries, pecans, and the Jerusalem artichoke originated in
what is now the United States and Canada.”49 Though colonists traveled to
the “new world” with seeds from Europe, many of these seeds were ill-
suited to the different growing conditions of America, and early settlers
relied on the crops of American Indians to survive.50 Early on, the founders
of the United States recognized the crucial role of PGRs in the country’s
sustainability.
As the young nation worked to establish itself, the government in-
vested heavily in the collection and distribution of exotic germplasm, rely-
ing on farmers to experiment with and adapt crops to “thousands of diverse
ecological niches.”51 In 1819, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, William
L. Crawford, requested assistance from the country’s foreign consuls and
naval officers in this endeavor.52 The effort grew, and the Navy eventually
authorized official plant exploration expeditions; throughout the mid-1800s,
plant germplasm poured in from around the globe.53 In 1839, the Commis-
sioner of Patents, Henry Ellsworth, obtained congressional funding for the
distribution of seed around the country.54 This free seed distribution pro-
gram proved extremely popular and effective, and remained intact until
1924.55 In 1850, the Patent Office Division of Agriculture was elevated to
department status, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) was
created in 1862.56 In addition to establishing agricultural colleges (land-
grant universities) and state agricultural experiment stations,57 the federal
government continued to fund national seed distributions: “As late as 1878,
fully a third of the department’s annual budget was being spent on germ-
plasm collection and distribution.”58 In 1897, the seed distribution program
reached an all-time high, with the government sending American farmers
22,195,381 packages of seed, each package containing five packets of dif-
ferent seed varieties.59
The broad distribution of diverse seeds was crucial to the success of
American agriculture, as “it was the farmers of the nation who molded [the
49. JACK RALPH KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLANT
BIOTECHNOLOGY, 1492–2000, at 46 (1988).
50. See id. at 51.
51. Id. at 56.
52. See id. at 53.
53. See id. at 55.
54. See id. at 55.
55. See id. at 71.
56. See id. at 58.
57. See Seeds of Dispute, supra note 12, at 85.
58. KLOPPENBURG, supra note 49, at 58, 60.
59. Id. at 63–64.
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foreign germplasm] into useful form.”60 Through “thousands of experi-
ments by thousands of farmers committing millions of hours of labor . . .
over a period of many decades,”61 U.S. farmers succeeded in adapting ex-
otic germplasm to the diverse environments of the United States, and devel-
oped “a firm agricultural foundation prepared for the rise of industrial
capitalism.”62 As the Commissioner of Agriculture, Norman Colman, noted
in 1885, “the increased production of wheat, oats, and other cereals and
grasses, has, by reason of the wide distribution of improved varieties, paid
tenfold the entire amount expended by the Department of Agriculture since
it was established.”63
As the United States government and the nation’s farmers developed
the country’s strong agricultural identity, the private seed industry played
only a minimal role.64 There are various reasons for this lack of private
investment in plant breeding. First, the nature of seeds allows a purchaser to
not only acquire a breeder’s plant, but the means to reproduce the variety
independently. At the time, “it occurred to no one that the [Patent Act]
might cover plants,”65 so it was difficult for breeders to recover financial
investments in crop development.66 Additionally, not only did the govern-
ment distribute large quantities of seed free of charge, government-certified
seed was regarded as the high-water mark for quality, resulting in tough
competition for private breeders.67
Around 1900, the work of Augustinian monk Gregor Mendel
(1822–1884) was re-discovered.68 Mendel’s work in plant genetics opened
the door for a major transformation in plant breeding; in essence, a shift
from breeding as an “art” to a “science.”69 With a better understanding of
plant genetics, “for the first time the plant breeder had a clear idea of how to
proceed with crop improvement.”70 Plant explorers and breeders began to
look for superior characteristics, rather than superior varieties; it became a
“search not for useful plants but for useful genes.”71 Research began in
hybrid plants (which at that time involved merely “the cross-breeding or
60. Id. at 56.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 57.
63. Id. at 60 (quoting 1885 U.S.D.A. ANN. REP. OF THE COMM’R OF AGRIC.).
64. See Weeds, Seeds & Deeds, supra note 4, at 260.
65. KLOPPENBURG, supra note 49, at 54.
66. See Weeds, Seeds & Deeds, supra note 4, at 260; see also Debra L. Blair, Intellectual
Property Protection and its Impact on the U.S. Seed Industry, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 297, 302
(1999) (“Because of the perceived lack of protection for seed collectors’ investment or the plant
breeders’ efforts and insight, there was little incentive to introduce and adapt new varieties.”).
67. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 49, at 64, 81.
68. See Weeds, Seeds & Deeds, supra note 4, at 268.
69. See id.
70. KLOPPENBURG, supra note 49, at 70 (quoting Garrison Wilkes, Current Status of Crop
Germplasm, CRITICAL REVIEWS IN PLANT SCIENCES (citation omitted)).
71. KLOPPENBURG, supra note 49, at 80.
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 133 Side B      05/11/2012   16:54:17
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 133 Side B      05/11/2012   16:54:17
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\8-3\UST312.txt unknown Seq: 9 11-MAY-12 13:37
554 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:3
sexual combination of two varieties of plant.”),72 and yields, such as corn,
were increased.73
Unlike open-pollinated varieties, seeds from hybrid plants lack the
vigor of the first generation, thus requiring farmers to re-purchase rather
than save hybrid seeds.74 The private seed industry was quick to take ad-
vantage of this opportunity.75 Some modern geneticists are skeptical of the
value of hybrid techniques versus traditional methods of “population im-
provement,” and believe research efforts were shifted to hybrids purely be-
cause of the “enormous profit opportunities for private enterprises.”76
Through the hybrid seed market, the private seed industry ultimately dis-
covered a means to compete with public breeders. In order to expand its
role in the agricultural sector, the private seed industry, through its lobby
association, the American Seed Trade Association (ASTA), also sought IP
protection for crop developments.77
B. The Plant Patent Act of 1930: Creation of IP Protection for Plants
In 1930, the private seed industry won a major victory: congressional
acknowledgment of certain plants as patentable subject matter. That year,
the United States passed the ground-breaking Plant Patent Act (PPA). The
PPA was the first legislation in the world to specifically allow IP protection
for plants.78
The PPA created a new type of patent, a “plant patent.” Like § 101
utility patents and § 171 design patents, plant patents are administered by
the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).79 The PPA grants patent protection
to the inventor or discoverer of a qualifying asexually reproduced plant va-
riety.80 Asexual reproduction is reproduction “by grafting, budding, or the
like, and produces an offspring with a genetic combination identical to that
of the single parent – essentially a clone.”81 A patent under the PPA grants
the “right to exclude others from asexually reproducing the plant, and from
using, offering for sale, or selling the plant so reproduced, or any of its
parts, throughout the United States, or from importing the plant so repro-
duced, or any parts thereof, into the United States.”82 The PPA requires an
eligible variety to be asexually reproduced and only offers protection
72. Id. at 68.
73. Id. at 91.
74. Id. at 93.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 93–94.
77. Blair, supra note 66, at 307.
78. Seeds of Dispute, supra note 12, at 96; W. Lesser, From Penury to Prodigal: Protection
Creep for U.S. Plant Varieties, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 235, 243 (2009).
79. J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 125, 133 n.5 (2001).
80. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2006).
81. J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc., 534 U.S. at 132.
82. 35 U.S.C. § 163 (2006).
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against further asexual reproduction of a patented variety; thus, another is
not barred from sexually reproducing a protected variety.83
In addition to the asexual reproduction requirement, the PPA requires a
plant to be “new” and “distinct,”84 and “[t]he provisions of Title 35 that
apply to utility patents also apply to plant patents granted under the PPA to
the extent not otherwise provided. Therefore, the provisions of Title 35 re-
lating to novelty, utility, and non-obviousness are theoretically equally ap-
plicable to plant patents and utility patents.”85 The PPA relaxes the typical
written description required for a patent: “No plant shall be declared invalid
for noncompliance with section 112 of this title if the description is as com-
plete as is reasonably possible. The claim in the specification shall be in
formal terms to the plant shown and described.”86 Alternatively, a deposit
of a biological specimen is accepted in place of the typical written
description.87
Congress introduced IP protection for certain plants in an attempt to
provide incentives to invest in breeding, and allow researchers to recoup
their investment.88 “One rationale for the bill was to ‘remove the existing
discrimination between plant developers and industrial inventors.’”89 Al-
though the PPA created new and innovative IP rights for plant developers,
Congress specifically tailored a separate, narrow patent specifically for
plants. Although history has taken a different course, as shown below, some
argue that this Act evidences Congress’ intent to exclude sexually repro-
duced staple crops — which do not qualify for plant patents — from patent
protection.90
C. The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970: Expanding IP Rights for
Plants
Although the PPA was a significant breakthrough for the private seed
industry, breeders were not satisfied with the IP protection granted to them
by the PPA; the private seed industry sought a form of protection for sexu-
ally reproduced plants, meaning plants reproduced by seed.91 The ASTA
drafted legislation which became known as the Plant Variety Protection Act
(PVPA) and lobbied heavily for its passage.92 In 1970, Congress passed the
83. Seeds of Dispute, supra note 12, at 98.
84. 35 U.S.C. § 161.
85. Nicholas J. Seay, Protecting the Seeds of Innovation: Patenting Plants, 16 AIPLA Q.J.
418, 421 (1989).
86. 35 U.S.C. § 162 (2006).
87. Seeds of Dispute, supra note 12, at 97.
88. See Lesser, supra note 78, at 243.
89. Seay, supra note 85, at 420 (quoting S. Rep. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1930)).
90. See Weeds, Seeds & Deeds, supra note 4, at 281.
91. 7 U.S.C. § 2401(a)(6) (2003).
92. Blair, supra note 66, at 307.
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PVPA.93 In 1994, this Act was amended, further strengthening plant breed-
ers’ rights.94
The PVPA extends IP protection to qualifying, sexually reproduced
plant varieties (including tubers, but excluding fungi and bacteria).95 “Since
the 1994 amendments, the PVPA also protects ‘any variety that is essen-
tially derived from a protected variety,’. . . and ‘any variety whose produc-
tion requires the repeated use of a protected variety.’”96 Although the
protection created by this Act is patent-like, including the right to exclude,97
there are some important distinctions. Rather than a patent, breeders are
issued Plant Variety Protection certificates (PVP certificates).98 The rights
associated with a PVP certificate include two important exemptions, one for
research purposes and one for farmers who save and sell seeds.99 Also,
unlike the PPA, the PVPA is administered by the USDA rather than the
PTO.100 Additionally, protection is generally granted for twenty years from
the date the certificate is issued, but twenty-five years in the case of a tree
or vine.101
To qualify for a PVP certificate, a variety must be new, distinct, uni-
form, and stable.102 It must also be sexually reproduced and include a
description which is as complete as possible.103 “Nothing in the PVPA . . .
precludes the patenting of newly ‘discovered’ plants in addition to those
bred by researchers.”104 This may include IP protection for the “discoverer”
of a “crop variety used for centuries by native people in a less developed
country.”105
Congress expanded IP protection for plants to bolster agricultural de-
velopment. “The purpose of the PVPA is ‘to encourage the development of
novel varieties of sexually reproduced plants and to make them available to
the public, providing protection available to those who breed, develop, or
discover them, and thereby promoting progress in agriculture in the public
interest.’”106 In other words, Congress hoped “to provide developers of
novel plant varieties with ‘adequate encouragement for research, and for
93. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2582 (2006).
94. Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 103–349, § 1406, 108 Stat. 3136
(1970) (amended 1994).
95. 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (2003).
96. J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 139–40 (2001) (quoting 7
U.S.C. §§ 2541(c)(1), 2541(c)(3)).
97. 7 U.S.C. § 2483(a)(1) (2003).
98. See Gustad, supra note 11, at 465.
99. Seeds of Dispute, supra note 12, at 100.
100. See id.
101. 7 U.S.C. § 2483(b)(1) (2003).
102. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a)(1)–(4) (2003).
103. Gustad, supra note 11, at 465.
104. Id. at 472.
105. Id. at 472 n.159.
106. Id. at 464–65 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1605, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 84 Stat. 1542 (1970),
reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1793).
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marketing when appropriate, to yield for the public the benefits of new
varieties.’”107
In the PVPA, Congress attempts to balance the investment incentives
offered through IP protection with other valuable aspects of crop develop-
ment through two important exemptions, the research exemption and the
farmers’ exemption. The research exemption provides that “[t]he use and
reproduction of a protected variety for plant breeding or other bona fide
research shall not constitute an infringement of the protection provided
under this Act.”108 The farmers’ exemption allows farmers to continue the
age-old tradition of selecting, harvesting, cleaning, and saving seed from
their crop for replanting.109 It also “allows farmers to make some sales of
protected variety seed to other farmers.”110
Despite its original breadth, the scope of the farmers’ exemption was
severely limited by Congress’ 1994 amendments to the PVPA111 and by a
1995 Supreme Court decision, Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer.112 In 1990,
Iowa farmers Denny and Becky Winterboer planted 265 acres of their 800-
acre farm with PVP-protected Asgrow soybeans.113 This crop produced
enough seed to plant 10,000 acres.114 Participating in a practice arguably
covered by the farmers’ exemption (“brown-bag” sales)115 the Winterboers
sold their entire soybean crop as seed.116 Asgrow filed suit against the
Winterboers, seeking damages and a permanent injunction against selling
seeds harvested from their protected varieties.117 While the Winterboers ar-
gued that their brown-bag sales fell within the statutory exemption,118 As-
grow argued “the exemption allows a farmer to save and resell to other
farmers only the amount of seed the seller would need to replant his own
107. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 181 (1995) (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2581).
108. 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2003). See also Crocker, supra note 24, at 261; Blair, supra note 66, at
313–31; Goss, supra note 21, at 1409–10.
109. See 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (2003).
110. Asgrow, 513 U.S. at 181. See also Gustad, supra note 11, at 465–66; David G. Scalise &
Daniel Nugent, International Intellectual Property Protections for Living Matter: Biotechnology,
Multinational Conventions and the Exception for Agriculture, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 83,
94–95 (1995).
111. Goss, supra note 21, at 1410, 1413–14.
112. Asgrow, 513 U.S. at 179. See also Weeds, Seeds & Deeds, supra note 4, at 290–92;
Crocker, supra note 24, at 267–68; Blair, supra note 66, at 313; Goss, supra note 21, at 1410–14;
Gustad, supra note 11, at 466–69. The Court decided Asgrow after Congress passed the 1994
amendments, but before the amendments were effective.
113. Asgrow, 513 U.S. at 181–82.
114. Asgrow, 513 U.S. at 182.
115. “A brown-bag sale occurs when a farmer purchases seed from a seed company, such as
Asgrow, plants the seed in his own fields, harvests the crop, cleans it, and then sells the repro-
duced seed to other farmers (usually in nondescript brown bags) for them to plant as crop seed on
their own farms.” Id. On average, the Winterboers’ brown-bag seed sold for $8.70 per bushel,
while seed directly from Asgrow sold for $16.20 to $16.80 per bushel. Id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 183–84.
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fields.”119 Looking at the language of the exemption,120 the Court hinged its
decision on “whether the Winterboers’ planting and harvesting were con-
ducted ‘as a step in marketing’ Asgrow’s protected seed varieties for grow-
ing purposes.”121 Disagreeing with the Federal Circuit, the majority
concluded that “marketing” does not require “extensive or coordinated sell-
ing activities, such as advertising, using an intervening sales representative,
or similar extended merchandising or retail activities.”122 The Court speci-
fied that a farmer does not qualify for the exemption “if he plants and saves
seeds for the purpose of selling the seeds that they produce for replant-
ing.”123 Consequently, the exemption applies only “if a farmer saves seeds
to replant his acreage, but for some reason changes his plans.”124 The Court
adds, in footnote 5, that
[f]or crops such as soybeans, in which the seed and the harvest
are one and the same, this will mean enough seeds for one year’s
crop on that acreage . . . . [For crops] in which the seed is not the
harvest, and a portion of the crop must be permitted to overripen
(‘go to seed’) in order to obtain seeds,125
the Court accepted the practice of “growing” seeds only every four to five
years, noting that
[a] vegetable farmer who sets aside protected seed with subse-
quent replantings in mind, but who later abandons his plan (be-
cause he has sold his farm, for example), would under our
analysis be able to sell all his saved seed, even though it would
plant (in a single year) four or five times his current acreage.126
In his dissent, Justice Stevens reasons “[t]here must be a reason Con-
gress used the word ‘marketing’ rather than the more common term ‘sell-
ing.’”127 He believes “Congress wanted to allow any ordinary brown-bag
sale from one farmer to another.”128 The majority disagreed, however, and
their interpretation of the pre-amendment statute severely limited one of the
Act’s unique exemptions. This decision evidences judicial support for
strong IP rights for plant breeders, at the expense of farmers.
119. Id. at 185.
120. A “farmer does not qualify for the exemption from infringement liability if he has ‘(3)
sexually multiplied the novel variety as a step in marketing (for growing purposes) the variety.’”
Asgrow, 513 U.S. at 186 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2541(3) (2006)).
121. Asgrow, 513 U.S. at 186–87.
122. Id. at 187 (quoting Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 982 F.2d 486, 492 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
123. Asgrow, 513 U.S. at 188.
124. Id. at 191.
125. Id. at 191 n.5.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 193 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 194.
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D. Utility Patents: Litigation Further Expands the Scope of IP Rights
for Plants
In 2001, the United States Supreme Court solidified the growing IP
protection available to plant breeders through its recognition of plants as
eligible subject matter for utility patents. This section first provides a brief
overview of utility patents, followed by a comparison between utility pat-
ents and PVP certificates. Finally, this section traces the judicial decisions
which caused plants to migrate within the scope of utility patents.
“The Constitution grants Congress broad power to legislate to ‘pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.’”129 Based on this grant of power, a patent board (which
evolved into the present-day PTO) was established in 1790.130 One form of
patent offered by the PTO, a utility patent (UP), is available to “[w]hoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”131 In
addition to the “new and useful” requirements, an eligible invention or dis-
covery must be non-obvious132 and there must be a written description that
includes
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contem-
plated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.133
Qualifying inventions and discoveries receive patent protection for twenty
years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed.134
In regard to plants, UPs confer greater rights of exclusion than a PVP
certificate.135 First, there are no exemptions for research and development
or for farmers to save seed.136 Second, while both the PPA and the PVPA
offer IP protection through a single claim on a plant or variety, multiple
UPs may be issued for various aspects of a single plant, including different
parts or processes, resulting in “the opportunity for greater and broader ex-
clusionary rights.”137 Given these advantages, plant breeders eventually
129. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
130. U.S. Nat’l Archives and Records Admin., Guide to Federal Records: Records of the
Patent and Trademark Office, http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/241.
html (last visited Dec. 20, 2010).
131. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
132. Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
133. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
134. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
135. J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 143 (2001).
136. Id. at 129 n.1; Ex parte Hibberd, No. 645–91, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, 446 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 24,
1985).
137. See Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 446.
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sought UP protection for their crop developments. This effort was contro-
versial, as UPs “cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of
nature.”138
Congress has never specifically qualified plants for UP protection, and
legislative intent is debatable. However, plants are currently eligible for UP
protection in addition to plant patents and Plant Variety Protection (PVP)
certificates. Unlike the IP rights granted under the PPA and the PVPA,
plants migrated into the realm of UP protection via the judicial branch.
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark patent
decision, Diamond v. Chakrabarty.139 In a five-four opinion, the Court
found a live, genetically engineered bacterium as eligible subject matter for
a utility patent. The majority concluded that Chakrabarty’s micro-organism,
engineered to break down multiple components of crude oil, constituted a
“manufacture” or “composition of matter” within the meaning of the stat-
ute.140 The majority found that Congress’ enactment of the PPA and the
PVPA does not demonstrate a congressional understanding that living
things are outside the scope of utility patents.141 The dissent disagreed, stat-
ing “[t]hese Acts strongly evidence a congressional limitation that excludes
bacteria from patentability.”142
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Chakrabarty, the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences addressed the issue of granting utility pat-
ents for plants, including seeds, plants, and tissue cultures.143 Referencing
Chakrabarty, the Board found that “neither the PPA nor the PVPA ex-
pressly excludes any plant subject matter from protection under Section 101
[the UP section].”144 The Board concluded that plants which meet the spe-
cific requirements of Section 101 may concurrently receive plant-specific
IP protection (under the PPA or the PVPA) and UP protection.145 Following
this decision, it became “the unbroken practice of the PTO . . . to confer
utility patents for plants.”146
Sixteen years later, in 2001, plants’ eligibility for UP protection was
challenged and the issue reached the Supreme Court.147 In a six-two deci-
sion, the Court found that the PPA and the PVPA do not provide exclusive
forms of IP protection for plants; citing Chakrabarty, the Court held that
plants may be issued UPs.148 Unlike the majority, the dissent distinguished
138. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
139. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
140. Id. at 305, 307–10.
141. Id. at 310–12.
142. Id. at 318–19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
143. Ex parte Hibberd, No. 645–91, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, 443 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 24, 1985)
144. Id. at 445.
145. See id. at 446.
146. J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 131 (2001).
147. Id. at 124.
148. Id. at 126–27, 130–32.
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the holding in Chakrabarty from the question presented in the case at hand,
J.E.M. Ag. Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, noting that bacteria are not the sub-
ject of either the PPA or the PVPA.149 The dissent compellingly analyzes
the language, structure, history, and purpose of the plant-specific Acts and
concludes that it is “clear that the Utility Patent Statue does not apply to
plants. Nothing in Chakrabarty holds to the contrary.”150 Since the Su-
preme Court handed down this decision, Congress has not provided a dif-
ferent answer to the question of whether plants are eligible for UP
protection. Therefore, plants are currently eligible for UP protection, as well
as PPA and PVPA protection.
III. CURRENT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTIONS ARE
CONTRIBUTING TO THE RAPID DECLINE IN
CROP GENETIC DIVERSITY
There is a connection between IP rights in plants and the erosion of
genetic diversity. This section examines this relationship in the context of
the United States. As one professor notes,
[A]s private companies move into the seed and agricultural sec-
tor, they avail themselves of different types of intellectual-prop-
erty protection to secure their investment. . . . [T]he presence of
intellectual-property protection encourages certain types of activ-
ity and investment that, while not antagonistic to biodiversity,
may give rise to patterns that erode biodiversity.151
Given the precarious state of crop genetic diversity in the U.S., it would be
prudent for the legislature to seriously consider how modern IP protection
for plants is contributing to the destabilization of the nation’s food supply,
and to readjust IP rights in plants to better serve the goals of the patent
system.
The very guidelines for IP protection promote the development of uni-
form crops. The United States has developed a “legal regime . . . [which
treats] uniform varieties bred for industrial agriculture as intellectual prop-
erty.”152 In other words, breeders are encouraged to cultivate uniform crops
with stable traits; in fact, these characteristics are necessary for breeders to
reap the benefits of IP protection. For example, breeders may develop pat-
entable plants by crossing “plants with desirable characteristics and then
inbreeding the resulting plants for several generations until the resulting
plant line is homogenous.”153 In order to benefit from the financial incen-
tives of IP protection, plant breeders are likely to cultivate monocultures,
rather than diverse crops. Additionally, IP protection incentivizes redirec-
149. Id. at 147–48 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 156 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
151. Seeds of Dispute, supra note 12, at 159.
152. Id. at 130.
153. J.E.M. Ag. Supply, 534 U.S. at 127.
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tion of research to cash crops, while other crop varieties are neglected.154
Again, the result is a loss in crop genetic diversity.
IP protection is intended to encourage innovation by protecting the
fruits of one’s labor. Despite the goals of IP law, there is concern that the
current array of IP protection for plants is actually inhibiting innovation.155
By decreasing plant breeders’ access to germplasm, IP protection tends to
decrease development of new varieties, and thus overall crop diversity.156
Even the ASTA, the seed industry lobbyist, acknowledges problems with
utility patents “locking up” germplasm.157 Some scholars believe the United
States’ web of IP protection for plants is creating an “anti-commons,” de-
scribed as “a situation where there are too many parties holding a right to
exclude with respect to a particular property/resource, thereby giving rise to
underutilization of the property or resource.”158 Under current IP protec-
tions, researchers and farmers are excluded from working with patented
plant elements and processes, likely stalling crop development. Proponents
of strong IP protection for plants argue that such protection provides incen-
tive for private plant breeding research, with the ultimate goal being better
seed cultivars and varieties for farmers.159 The “knowledge-property sys-
tems [of IP law, however,] incentivize and protect mass-market, seller-
based innovation,” dismissing user innovation.160 This is especially unfortu-
nate in agriculture, as the shift of farmers from developers to consumers is
linked with the loss of crop genetic diversity, as, unlike seed companies,
farmers adapted crops to their particular ecological niche rather than pursu-
ing a one-size-fits-all seed.161
The development and continual increase of IP protection for plants has
resulted in a skewed balance of public and private benefits, with the balance
strongly favoring private benefits.162 Following the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Chakrabarty, there was increased investment in the seed industry,163
coupled with a “merger-mania . . . ‘driven primarily by the need to avoid
high transaction costs associated with [clearing] multiple intellectual prop-
154. Keith Aoki, “Free Seeds, Not Free Beer”: Participatory Plant Breeding, Open Source
Seeds, and Acknowledging User Innovation in Agriculture, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275, 2298
(2009) [hereinafter Free Seeds, Not Free Beer].
155. See Peter Carstensen, Post-Sale Restraints via Patent Licensing: A “Seedcentric” Per-
spective, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1053, 1079 (2006); Goss, supra note 21,
at 1399.
156. See Goss, supra note 21, at 1423; Justin T. Rogers, The Encroachment of Intellectual
Property Protections on the Rights of Farmers, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 149, 165 (2010).
157. Goss, supra note 21, at 1428–29.
158. Free Seeds, Not Free Beer, supra note 154, at 2296 (citing Michael A. Heller, The Trag-
edy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV.
621 (1998)).
159. Blair, supra note 66, at 298.
160. Free Seeds, Not Free Beer, supra note 154, at 2276–77.
161. See id. at 2275.
162. Lesser, supra note 78, at 236.
163. Seeds of Dispute, supra note 12, at 136; see Weeds, Seeds & Deeds, supra note 4, at 252.
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erty rights.’”164 As companies merge, competition is reduced, and the re-
sulting monopolies may contribute to genetic uniformity and erosion.165
While seed companies profit from IP protection for their crop develop-
ments, farmers and consumers pay a high price. The public cost of UP pro-
tection for economically important crops is “preliminary estimated to be in
excess of $150 million annually for soybeans and cotton, and is not clearly
offset by additional public benefits. Indeed, the role of UP in further limit-
ing entry to plant breeding by restricting access to germplasm can have
greater long term public costs.”166
To serve the patent system’s goals of promoting innovation and fur-
thering the public good, Congress should reexamine the contours of IP pro-
tection for plants and work to ensure that access to these valuable resources
is not unduly restricted. Congress should keep in mind that agribusiness
giants are not the only innovators in seed development; farmers have been
contributing to this field since the practice of agriculture took root, and their
wisdom should not be overlooked.
IV. INEQUITABLE RIGHTS: IP LAW’S SELECTIVE RECOGNITION OF
AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION AND LABOR
In agriculture, where the current diversity of PGRs represents
thousands of years of human ingenuity and labor,167 IP law fosters a dis-
torted balance between initial and follow-on innovation.168 The IP system
focuses on a particular moment and individual, rewarding a specific devel-
opment while minimizing the agency and intervention of thousands.169 This
failure to recognize collective and incremental labor170 is particularly detri-
mental in the context of agriculture, where “farming practices developed
around the globe and over millennia, [while] plant breeding as an organized
industry has only been in existence for a little over a century.”171 The con-
sequences of current IP protections deplete crop genetic diversity around
the globe and raise serious concerns about justice and fairness. This section
presents a brief description of some of the inequities, abroad and within the
nation’s borders, stemming from the United States’ IP practices related to
PGRs.
164. Free Seeds, Not Free Beer, supra note 154, at 2297–98 (alteration in original) (quoting
Janet Elizabeth Hope, Open Source Biotechnology 50 (Dec. 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Austl. Nat’l Univ.) (available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=755
244)).
165. Goss, supra note 21, at 1423.
166. Lesser, supra note 78, at 272.
167. Seeds of Dispute, supra note 12, at 110.
168. Free Seeds, Not Free Beer, supra note 154, at 2276 n.2.
169. Weeds, Seeds & Deeds, supra note 4, at 258–59.
170. Id. at 313.
171. Free Seeds, Not Free Beer, supra note 154, at 2302.
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A. International Asymmetry
As the legal status of PGRs has shifted, so has their distribution around
the globe. In general, these resources have flowed out of the historically
gene-rich regions of the equatorial Southern Hemisphere and into the indus-
trial nations of the North. This shift has not happened in an equitable man-
ner. Despite ten thousand years of human intervention,172 the genetic
resources produced in the South have typically been described as “raw”
materials.173 With this mindset, Northern industrial nations have regularly
acquired these resources without offering any compensation to plant breed-
ers.174 Once in the hands of industrial nations, these “raw” genetic re-
sources are “worked” “to produce staple crops (and, more recently, plants
and seeds) that are protected by intellectual-property laws.”175 Through this
practice, it is possible “that people in less developed areas will be denied
recognition for the use of plants they have been using for generations . . .
[as there] is the possibility that more developed countries will patent their
native resources.”176
One modern development is the emergence of seed banks, which store
large amounts of germplasm in an effort to preserve PGRs.177 A dispropor-
tionate amount of these seed banks have been established in the industrial-
ized North.178 As a result, gene-poor nations such as the United States have
become
a net exporter of seed germplasm to supposedly ‘gene-rich’ coun-
tries. Conversely, the least-developed countries . . . are net im-
porters of seed germplasm, left dependent on access to seed banks
in the industrial nations, even though they may have been the
sources of the very seeds now collected in seed banks.179
As one scholar summarized,
[t]he skewed asymmetry whereby supposedly “primitive” plant
germplasm is legally constructed as the “common heritage of
(hu)mankind” allows removal from genetically rich regions of the
world for the cost of gathering a few samples. These “free” ge-
netic resources then flow into the gene banks of the North and
laboratories of agrichemical giants, where their diverse traits im-
prove and safeguard proprietary and patented cultivated varieties
that are then sold at a premium in newly-created markets fueling
172. Rogers, supra note 156, at 160.
173. See Seeds of Dispute, supra note 12, at 107.
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. Gustad, supra note 11, at 472, 472 n.159.
177. See Weeds, Seeds & Deeds, supra note 4, at 308.
178. Seeds of Dispute, supra note 12, at 107–08.
179. Id. at 108.
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 139 Side A      05/11/2012   16:54:17
31446-ust_8-3 Sheet No. 139 Side A      05/11/2012   16:54:17
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\8-3\UST312.txt unknown Seq: 20 11-MAY-12 13:37
2011] WE ARE WHAT WE EAT 565
industrial agriculture in the countries where the genetic resources
originated.180
The common distinction between “raw” and “worked” germplasm
does not provide an accurate understanding of the agricultural contributions
of our ancestors or present-day farmers. For millennia, farmers have been
improving crop varieties, developing the genetic resources on which plant
breeders now rely. Agricultural communities throughout history have pro-
duced PGRs of great value, and recognition of their efforts is warranted.
The rubber tree provides an economically poignant example. As noted
in Part I, in the late eighteenth century, Brazil enjoyed 95% of the world’s
rubber market.181 In an attempt to protect this resource, the government
banned the export of rubber tree germplasm.182 However, British agents
managed to smuggle out a few rubber seedlings.183 Britain subsequently
established successful rubber plantations in some of their equatorial colo-
nies, and their evasion of Brazilian law continues to impact today’s world
economy: in the twenty-first century, “the global rubber industry is domi-
nated by British and U.S. companies that get their supplies of raw latex
from former colonial possessions.”184 Similar exploitation happens with
staple crops, as industrial nations including the United States have set an
inequitable double standard, acquiring PGRs from underdeveloped nations
without compensation while demanding IP protection for their own crop
developments.
B. Domestic Inequities
As described in Part II of this Note, United States farmers played a
crucial role in adapting diverse germplasm to the nation’s unique ecosys-
tems. Their efforts helped to establish food security and a strong agricul-
tural base for the country. Despite countless contributions to crop
development, these very same stakeholders — farmers — are now paying
the price of IP protection, while seed companies reap the benefits.
In the United States, the seed industry is dominated by two agribusi-
ness giants: Monsanto and DuPont.185 Monsanto Company manufactures
the popular ROUNDUP® herbicide, as well as ROUNDUP READY® ge-
netic-modification technology, which enables modified seeds to withstand
ROUNDUP® herbicide and allows the herbicide to be “sprayed over the
top of an entire field, killing the weeds without harming the ROUNDUP
READY®” crops.186 Monsanto licenses their “ROUNDUP READY® tech-
180. Weeds, Seeds & Deeds, supra note 4, at 312.
181. Id. at 263.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Rogers, supra note 156, at 159.
186. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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nology through two interrelated licensing schemes.”187 First, it licenses its
patented gene to seed companies, in exchange for a royalty or “technology
fee.”188 Second, it requires seed companies to execute licenses, or “Tech-
nology Agreements,” between Monsanto and the seed companies’ farmer
customers.189 These Technology Agreements include a no-replant restric-
tion, meaning farmers must buy new seed from a licensed seed company
each year, rather than following the age-old tradition of seed saving.190
Monsanto’s Technology Agreements have been challenged in court,191 and
thus far, “[d]espite the obvious exploitation of buyers by this form of li-
cense, the Federal Circuit found no objection to it.”192
Farmers worry about the impact of increased IP rights on “the structure
of farming practice and their relationship with seed suppliers.”193 With seed
developers having legal ownership of PGRs, farmers experience “a general
reduction in the availability of a variety of crops”194 and “lack a voice in the
decisions affecting the direction of future research regarding the develop-
ment of new plants.”195 Farmers are being transformed from developers
into mere consumers, and society is rapidly losing valuable farmer know-
how.196
Techniques such as no-replant policies are also increasing production
costs for farmers.197 For example, the royalty or “technology fee” paid by a
seed company to a patent holder for use of a patented trait in soybean seeds
may be $6.50 for every fifty-pound bag of seed containing the trait,198 while
farmers may be required to purchase the same amount of seed containing
the patented trait for up to $14.199 If farmers were allowed to save patented
seed for replanting, and pay a royalty to the patent holder, they could save
approximately $7.50 per bag. The patent holder would still receive the same
compensation, diminishing only the current economic benefit to seed com-
panies. Interestingly, Monsanto itself owns several subsidiary seed compa-
nies — in the soybean market, for example, its subsidiaries “comprise
approximately 20 percent of the market for ROUNDUP READY®”
187. Id. at 1339.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.; Carstensen, supra note 155, at 1071.
191. See Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006); McFarling, 363 F.3d at
1336.
192. Carstensen, supra note 155, at 1072.
193. Goss, supra note 21, at 1426.
194. Gustad, supra note 11, at 471.
195. Id.
196. See Free Seeds, Not Free Beer, supra note 155, at 2298.
197. See Lesser, supra note 78, at 237.
198. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
199. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 182 (1995) (a bushel of soybeans is
approximately sixty pounds, resulting in a fifty-pound bag costing up to $14).
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seeds.200 Allowing saved seed also “provides a cap on the pricing freedom
of sellers of certified (new) seed.”201 In contrast, “[w]hile a seed company
has an absolute monopoly on a patented seed variety, there is no competi-
tion to drive down the price, which allows the seed company to charge the
maximum possible price that the buyer is willing to pay.”202 Decreasing the
seed industry’s concentration of power would benefit farmers, as increasing
seed costs may threaten the viability of small farms.203
Considering the invaluable crop developments made by generations of
farmers around the world, Congress should act in the interest of equity and
structure agricultural IP rights in such a way as to acknowledge past labor
and innovation of these stakeholders, and encourage future contributions.
Farmers and society would both benefit from greater farmer involvement in
seed selection, rather than leaving the power in the hands of seed
companies.
V. CONCLUSION: A PLEA TO CONGRESS
In Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “genetic re-
search and related technological developments . . . may result in a loss of
genetic diversity.”204 While recognizing that the eligibility of Chakrabarty’s
bacteria for a patent “may determine whether research efforts are acceler-
ated by the hope of reward or slowed by want of incentives,”205 the Court
clarified its role of interpreting the statute206 and called on the legislature to
analyze this “matter of high policy.”207 Congress has not responded since
Chakrabarty or its progeny.
The time is ripe for Congress to heed the Court’s call. This Note urges
Congress to contrast the principles behind the patent system to the present-
day tapestry of IP protection for plants. In light of the modern crisis sur-
rounding PGRs, as well as agriculture’s unique historical development, the
author asks Congress to re-articulate the contours of IP protection for
plants, evaluating proposals in light of how well they (1) protect crop ge-
netic diversity and (2) equitably recognize the contributions and innovations
of various stakeholders. To begin the dialogue, the author suggests four
possibilities. First, in order to increase access to germplasm for crop devel-
opment, Congress could create a research exemption for plants covered by
UPs. Second, no-replant policies could be prohibited. By creating a system
in which farmers make equitable royalty payments to patent holders in ex-
200. McFarling, 363 F.3d at 1339.
201. Carstensen, supra note 155, at 1072.
202. Rogers, supra note 156, at 160.
203. See Goss, supra note 21, at 1399, 1425.
204. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980).
205. Id. at 317.
206. Id. at 318.
207. Id. at 317.
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change for the ability to save seeds year to year, Congress could protect the
interests of both patent holders and farmers. Third, Congress could protect
farmers who opt not to plant genetically modified seeds, including organic
farmers, by passing a law which clearly holds patent holders accountable
for the spread of their genetically modified crops. If a patented trait contam-
inates a farmer’s field, the farmer should receive compensation for the dam-
age done to his or her enterprise, and not be held strictly liable for patent
infringement.208 Finally, Congress could reexamine the distinction between
“raw” and “worked” germplasm. Considering the incremental develop-
ments made by countless people throughout the history of agriculture, Con-
gress could consider either holding the germplasm in seed banks as the
common heritage of humankind, rather than as sovereign national property,
or create a system for compensating the communities which originally de-
veloped the multitude of PGRs now incorporated into commodified seeds.
These ideas merely begin the conversation. The author begs Congress
to address the question of wise IP protection for plants before the world
loses the genetic resources necessary to cope with future environmental
stresses and unforeseen pests and diseases — before the time bomb in our
farmers’ fields leads us to a rendezvous with extinction.
208. For a Canadian case addressing this question, and finding the farmer strictly liable, see
Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.).
